Baurès et al. [Baurès, R., Benguigui, N., Amorim, M.-A., & Siegler, I. A. (2007) . Intercepting free falling objects: Better use Occam's razor than internalize Newton's law. Vision Research, 47, 2982-2991] rejected the hypothesis that free-falling objects are intercepted using a predictive model of gravity. They argued instead for ''a continuous guide for action timing" based on visual information updated till target capture. Here we show that their arguments are flawed, because they fail to consider the impact of sensori-motor delays on interception behaviour and the need for neural compensation of such delays. When intercepting a free-falling object, the delays can be overcome by a predictive model of the effects of gravity on target motion.
Introduction
Baurès, Benguigui, Amorim, and Siegler (2007, hereafter referred to as Baurès) recently reassessed the problem of internalization of gravity for interception of free-falling objects by critically reviewing the relevant literature. They raised a number of theoretical and methodological concerns with the experiments supporting the hypothesis of an internal model of gravity. Moreover, they rejected the idea that predictive models can account for the described interceptive behaviour. They argued instead for ''a continuous guide for action timing", in which the control of interceptive movements would be updated continuously till target capture based upon on-line visual information.
With their review, Baurès have launched a provocative discussion on the importance of internal models in the control of interceptive behaviour. While Baurès reject the hypothesis of an internal model of gravity, they ''agree that a basic knowledge of the effect of gravity could be used in specific situations to modulate the timing of interceptive actions" (p. 2990). Much ado about nothing? Not really, because some of the conclusions of Baurès are based on erroneous assumptions in the interpretation of many of our experiments and on an incomplete analysis of the available data. Baurès' analysis also fails to consider the fundamental constraints of neural processing. In doing so, they draw an unnecessarily stark divide between prospective versus predictive control and the meaning and use of internal models. In the present article we address the concerns (theoretical and methodological) raised by Baurès concerning our earlier work, and we reiterate our hypothesis based on this previous work.
Visuo-motor control of interception
Two broad styles of visuo-motor control are typically contrasted in the specialized literature (Bootsma, Fayt, Zaal, & Laurent, 1997; Brenner, Smeets, & de Lussanet, 1998; Dessing, Bullock, Peper, & Beek, 2002; Tresilian, 2004 Tresilian, , 2005 : Predictive versus prospective control, which can arguably be divided theoretically into the hypothesis of internal models, on the one hand, and the hypothesis of high-bandwidth agent-environment interactions without internal models, on the other (Grush, 2005) . However, the evidence gained over the last several years is pretty clear on this issue. Ballistic interception of rapidly moving targets cannot be performed solely under sensory feedback because of noise, inaccuracies and delays in the feedback loops. To overcome these problems, the brain may use an internal model of the object dynamics, a model that can either be acquired through learning or be innate. When the model becomes fully operational, the movement can be performed in feedforward mode (e.g., Kawato, 1999; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Flanagan, 2001; Wilmut, Wann, & Brown, 2006; Zago & Lacquaniti, 2005c) .
For the specific case of interception of free-falling objects, Baurès appear to entirely dismiss the role of predictive control in favour of ''a continuous guide for action timing", in which interceptive movements are updated continuously till target capture based upon on-line visual information. We agree that visuo-motor responses can be updated in a continuous fashion, to the extent allowed by the timing constraints of the CNS. Unfortunately, however, Baurès go too far in rejecting a potential role of internal models, because they fail to consider the impact of sensori-motor delays on interception behaviour. These delays imply that the CNS cannot act quickly enough to use the new sensory information that arises in the time period just prior to the arrival of the ball at the interception point. It is because of this ''blind" period that internal models become particularly important. In the following, we discuss the criticisms raised by Baurès, and discuss how the concepts of continuous control and an internal model of gravity converge to provide a coherent picture of how humans perform interceptive actions.
Evidence for an internal model of free fall
A critical experiment we did to demonstrate the anticipation of gravity for interception was to ask subjects to catch or punch targets descending along the vertical (Lacquaniti & Maioli, 1989b; McIntyre, Zago, Berthoz, & Lacquaniti, 2001; Zago et al., 2004) . Movements directed to intercept targets accelerated by Earth's gravity (1g) are well synchronized with the arrival of the ball. Instead, the same movements directed toward constant speed (0g) targets are timed too early. Full 0g conditions for all sensory and motor systems were tested in the Spacelab (McIntyre et al., 2001) , while 0g conditions just for the visual target were created in the laboratory (Zago et al., 2004) . In theory, extensive practice with 0g targets might lead subjects to switch off the default mode used to intercept 1g targets, and to rely instead entirely on visual feedback to estimate time-to-contact (TTC) for 0g targets. It is known (e.g., de Bruyn & Orban, 1988; McKee, Silverman, & Nakayama, 1986; Werkhoven, Snippe, & Toet, 1992 ) that motion at constant speed can be measured reliably by the visual system in the velocity range used in our experiments, and can be used to predict TTC for targets moving along the horizontal (Lee, 1976; Merchant & Georgopoulos, 2006; Regan & Gray, 2000; Tresilian, 1999) . However, the possibility that subjects relied solely on visual feedback in our experiments was refuted by two observations. (1) The responses to 0g targets always remained premature even at the end of extensive 0g practice. The time shift of the responses was consistent with the application of an internal model of acceleration due to gravity (McIntyre et al., 2001; Zago & Lacquaniti, 2005b; Zago et al., 2004) . (2) The unexpected occurrence of 1g catch trials, randomly presented with low probability (9%) during immersive 0g training, caused significant after-effects, consistent with the operation of an internal model rather than with sensory feedback (Zago et al., 2004 . In motor learning paradigms, catch trials are typically used to reveal the presence of after-effects due to adaptation of an internal model (Shadmehr & Mussa-Ivaldi, 1994) .
Impact of neuromechanical delays
Spatial accuracies of a few centimeters and temporal accuracies of a few milliseconds are typically necessary for successful interception performance (Regan, 1997; Zago & Lacquaniti, 2005a) . The required kind of visuo-motor co-ordination poses fundamental challenges to the neural control systems (Merchant & Georgopoulos, 2006) . Motor accuracy stands in sharp contrast with the limits imposed by ubiquitous neural and mechanical delays intervening between the stimulus changes and the ensuing adjustments of motor output. Transmission delays cumulate as information is relayed and processed at the different stages of visuo-motor pathways, starting with the processing of optic information in the retina (Nijhawan, in press ). The overall visuo-motor delay estimated from human behavioural studies can be in the order of 150-200 ms.
Thus, the overall delay between a change in target velocity and the corresponding motor response amounts to about 200 ms for a task involving hits of a moving target (Brenner et al., 1998) . Similar estimates were reached by Paillard (1996) , Port, Lee, Dassonville, and Georgopoulos (1997) , Land and McLeod (2000) , Saunders and Knill (2003) , and Senot, Prevost, and McIntyre (2003) . Interestingly, also previous work from the group of Baurès estimated that interceptive actions are planned 200 ms prior to the initiation of the motor response (Benguigui, Ripoll, & Broderick, 2003) . Therefore, neural and mechanical delays together may be one to two orders of magnitude longer than the temporal accuracy required for successful interception. Unless the CNS has mechanisms built-in to compensate for such delays, the interception action would be based on obsolete visual information about target motion and, as a consequence, the target would be badly missed (Nijhawan, in press ).
The lack of consideration to sensori-motor delays leads Baurès to incorrectly reject the conclusions of our earliest work on catching behaviour (Lacquaniti & Maioli, 1987 , 1989a , 1989b Lacquaniti, Carrozzo, & Borghese, 1993a) . In these papers, subjects were asked to catch a ball of variable mass (between 0.2 and 0.8 kg) dropped vertically from above the outstretched hand. Heights of fall were varied between 0.2 and 1.6 m. It was found that flexor muscles of the elbow started to contract at an approximately constant time before expected contact, independent of the height of fall and mass of the ball (Fig. 1) .
The time of onset of anticipatory activity relative to contact reflects the estimate of target TTC available to the motor system to initiate the response. The onset time and the time course of these anticipatory responses did not change with the height of fall, nor did they depend on the ball mass. Not only did subjects time the anticipatory responses to the expected arrival time of the ball on the hand, but they also gated the stretch reflex responses just around the same time (Fig. 2) .
A stretch reflex evoked by an external perturbation normally obeys the principle of reciprocal innervation between antagonist muscles: The muscles that are stretched by the perturbation are activated, whereas the shortened muscles relax. During the catching task, instead, the responses were gated just before the contact time with the result that both stretched and shortening muscles were co-activated reflexively (Lacquaniti, Borghese, & Carrozzo, 1991 . This reflex co-activation, along with the anticipatory contraction described above, contribute to increase the overall stiffness and viscosity of the limb around the time of contact with the incoming ball (Lacquaniti, Carrozzo, & Borghese, 1993b) . The overall conclusion from these studies was that the effects of Earth gravity on object motion are taken into account in timing the manual interception of a falling ball.
Baurès only consider the results on EMG anticipatory activity from different heights and make two different arguments, both flawed. First, they suggest that subjects ''must simply react as quickly as possible" for the lowest drop heights (0.2, 0.4 and 0.8 m), with ''the implication that no information about the kinematics of the moving object was used after its release" (p. 2984). However, they fail to reconcile this hypothesis with the available data on anticipatory EMG responses. Thus, for a height of 0.4 m, the drop time is 285 ms and the EMG response starts 150 ms prior to impact. The reaction time would therefore be 135 ms. The same reaction time applied to a 0.8 m drop would generate EMG activity 265 ms prior to impact, the total drop time for this height being 400 ms. Again, this is clearly not the case in Fig. 1 . Second, Baurès claim that the results from the higher heights (1.2 and 1.6 m) cannot discriminate between a first-order (TTC1) and a second-order (TTC2) strategy of interception. However, Baurès fail to consider that the overall time delay between a change in optic velocity and the ensuing motor response would be about 200 ms (see above). Fig. 3 shows the impact of a TTC1 prediction (such as one based on the tau function) applied to the interception of a TTC2 motion. The tau function is given by the ratio between the position of the target and its velocity (Lee, 1976) . For a looming target, tau corresponds to the ratio between the retinal image and its expansion rate.
The instantaneous values of TTC predicted by TTC1 are plotted versus the actual TTC2 values in Fig. 3 (Left) , and the corresponding timing errors (difference between TTC1 and actual TTC2) are plotted in Fig. 3 (Right). Baurès note that the difference between TTC1 and TTC2 for TTC2 = 150 ms is small for the two higher drop heights (33 and 27 ms), a difference that may or may not be reliably detected based on EMG measurements. However, one immediately notices that TTC1 leads to substantially greater temporal errors for small increases in lead times: When 200 ms remain before ball arrival (assuming just 50 ms of transmission time between central structures and the onset of EMG anticipatory activity), TTC1 overestimates actual TTC2 by 234, 98, 68 and 54 ms for drop heights of 0.4, 0.8, 1.2 and 1.6 m, respectively. The errors become even larger when longer, more physiological values of transmission time are assumed, and when one corrects for the by-pass approach (Tresilian, 1999) . However, the experiments cited above showed that no such errors were ever made by the subjects (Lacquaniti, Carrozzo, & Borghese, 1993a; Lacquaniti & Maioli, 1989b ). The conclusion, therefore, is that sensori-motor delays for both anticipatory and reflex responses are overcome by a predictive model of target fall based on information about target acceleration. We argued in the first part of this article that such a second-order predictive model incorporates implicit knowledge about gravity effects on object motion.
Internal models and continuous control are not mutually exclusive
In further work criticized by Baurès (McIntyre et al., 2001) , we studied the catching task of Lacquaniti and Maioli (1989b) in the microgravity conditions of low-Earth-orbit flight. A ball launcher attached to the Spacelab 'ceiling' projected a ball 'downward' from a height of 1.6 m above the outstretched hand. 'Downward' motion in a space module means a motion directed from the ceiling toward the floor. In the absence of gravity effects, the ball descends at constant speed. This is the prototypical condition where a strategy based on TTC1 information should provide the best results (Lee, 1976; Rushton & Wann, 1999) . Instead, the inappropriate application of an internal model of Earth's gravity to microgravity would assume that the ball is accelerated by 1g, and therefore should lead to underestimates of the actual TTC. The results were crystal clear: The responses started earlier in weightlessness than on the ground (McIntyre et al., 2001) .
The values computed by Baurès to refute this study appear to be based on the invalid assumption that the subjects predict TTC only once, immediately when the ball exits the launch tube. The time it takes a ball to traverse 1.6 m would be indeed much longer at constant velocity than at constant 1g acceleration, but the errors of 234, 517 and 1781 ms claimed by Baurès (p. 2985) would occur only if the subject made an initial prediction of when the ball will arrive in the hand, with no further adjustments to this estimate of TTC. It appears very unlikely, however, that subjects would not update TTC estimates during the flight of the ball when visual information is available during the trajectory. According to our version Impulse responses of biceps EMG activity were obtained by cross-correlating the EMG activities with the pseudorandom torque motor perturbations applied continuously before, during and after dropping a 0.6-kg ball from 1.6 m above the outstretched hand. On average, the first two principal components (pl and p2) accounted for 84 ± 4% of the total variance of biceps responses. Mean coefficients of pl and p2 (across all subjects and experiments) are plotted as a function of time from the onset of pseudorandom perturbations. Dashed horizontal lines are the zero-lines for p1 and p2. The time of ball release and the time of arrival on the hand are indicated by the arrows (modified from Lacquaniti et al., 1991) . Notice the reversal of the stretch reflex responses in biceps just prior to ball arrival in the hand. of the internal model hypothesis (Lacquaniti et al., 1993a (Lacquaniti et al., , 1993b McIntyre et al., 2001; Senot, Zago, Lacquaniti, & McIntyre, 2005; Zago et al., 2004) , TTC is estimated by combining internalized effects of Earth gravity with on-line visual information (target position and velocity). Therefore, the internal model anticipates that the future downward motion will accelerate, while it continuously updates the TTC estimate based on on-line visual information up until the point when the threshold time has been reached (and the visuo-motor delay prevents further updates, see above). In other words, the internal model of gravity simply predicts that a downward moving object will accelerate during the sensori-motor delay period, i.e., during the final fraction of a second prior to impact when new visual information cannot be taken into account. The time shifts predicted by such an internal model of gravity were found to be in good agreement with the time shifts actually measured (see Fig. 3 of McIntyre et al., 2001 ).
Target interception windows cannot explain our results
In a number of experiments performed by Zago and colleagues (Zago & Lacquaniti, 2005b; Zago et al., 2004 Zago et al., , 2005 , different gravity levels were simulated for a visual target on Earth by means of a computer controlled projection system. A virtual sphere moved vertically downward on a wide empty screen with different laws of motion. Subjects were asked to punch a ball that fell hidden behind the screen, arriving in synchrony with the visual target. Initial speed of the visual target was randomized to make flight duration unpredictable from trial to trial. Subjects systematically timed their motor responses very differently when the visual target moved with an acceleration equivalent to gravity (1g) as compared with when the target moved at constant speed (0g). Motor responses generally were time-locked to the arrival of 1g targets, whereas the responses to 0g targets were premature. On average, subjects correctly intercepted 85% of 1g targets at the first attempt, but only 14% of 0g targets, consistent with the application of an internal model of Earth's gravity. Baurès correctly noticed that the time window of interception varies as a function of the terminal velocity of the virtual ball in this paradigm. Furthermore, we agree that the available error margin may influence both the choice of the interception strategy for a given task and the convergence of responses during learning . However, in Zago et al. series of studies, it was found that subjects systematically anticipated 0g targets not only for low velocities, but also at the highest tested velocity (4.5 m s
À1
) when the time window of interception was more similar to that of 1g targets. Thus, in this condition, punching responses associated with 0g targets led those associated with 1g targets by 113 ms, on average (see Fig. 5 in Zago et al., 2004) . By contrast, the time window of interception differed by only 8 ms between 0g targets and 1g targets in the same condition. Another point raised by Baurès for these experiments is that movement time and peak velocity of the hand were roughly constant, and did not exhibit the known relationship with target velocity (Brenner et al., 1998; Brouwer, Brenner, & Smeets, 2000; Tresilian & Plooy, 2006) . However, this is a further argument in favour of the idea that subjects were tuned to the expected motion of the hidden falling ball (whose terminal velocity was constant), supporting the hypothesis of the internal model of gravity.
What reference frame for an internal model of gravity?
In general, an internal estimate of gravity (ĝ h ) in a head-fixed frame of reference might be computed by the CNS as a Bayesian weighted average of multi-cue information, including visual, vestibular, neck and truncal signals (Glasauer & Mittelstaedt, 1998; MacNeilage, Banks, Berger, & Bulthoff, 2007; Mergner, Huber, & Becker, 1997; Van Beuzekom & Van Gisbergen, 2000; Zupan, Merfeld, & Darlot, 2002 ). An abstract representation of gravity (ĝ w ) accessible by the visual system can be constructed by a change of reference frame from head-fixed to world-fixed. An internal model of the effects of gravity on target motion may then result from the combination of ĝ w with on-line visual estimates about target motion, such as the instantaneous height of the target above the interception point and target velocity. The orientation of the world-frame for ĝ w is affected by the specific task and cognitive cues. Thus, when the target approaches our body, ĝ w should be aligned with the local laboratory-fixed frame. By contrast, when the target moves far off in a remote visual scene, ĝ w should be aligned with the remote scene. Evidence has recently been gained for both types of representations. In one study, sitting subjects wore a head-mounted stereoscopic display and were asked to intercept an approaching ball with a virtual racket (Senot et al., 2005) . They either pitched their head backward so as to look up toward the ball falling from a ceiling, or they pitched their head forward so as to look down toward the ball rising from a floor.
We found that, on average, the responses were reliably triggered 25 ms earlier when the ball was projected downward from above than when it rose from below, consistent with the anticipation of the effects of gravity on the flight of the ball during the visuo-motor delay period. Note that the responses differed depending on whether the subject looked up or down, even though the visual stimuli were the same in both cases. However, this bias disappeared completely when the head and neck posture with respect to Earth gravity was no longer relevant, that is, when subjects looked straight ahead and relied solely on vision to produce a response. This is evidence against a simple rule of perception-action coupling that does not take into account the direction of movement with respect to gravity. These results are instead consistent with an interception timing based on a ĝ w aligned with the local laboratory-fixed frame. In a different series of studies, instead, subjects pressed a button to intercept a ball moving up and down, depicted in a 2D pictorial scene including a person, a building and few other items, scaled to an apparent viewing distance of about 25 m (Indovina et al., 2005; Miller et al., 2007) . On average, the timing of the responses was quite accurate when the ball moved with kinematics consistent with natural gravity (scaled to the size of the scene), whereas the timing was much too early when the ball moved with an artificial kinematics that defies gravity. It was further shown that embedding the same kinds of motion in a blank scene eliminates the bias in favour of natural gravity (Miller et al., 2007) . Remarkably, the same pattern of interception responses was found whether subjects lay supine in an fMRI scanner and viewed the scene projected on a horizontal monitor, or they were seated in the laboratory and viewed the scene projected on a vertical monitor (Miller et al., 2007) . These results indicate that interception timing might be based on a ĝ w aligned with the visual scene, irrespective of the actual spatial orientation of the gravity vector and of the body.
Baurès claim a conflict between the Senot et al. (2005) and Indovina et al. (2005) sets of experiments, since in the latter the target moved orthogonal to gravity. This claim, however, neglects the vast literature on viewer-centred versus allocentric representations of structured visual information (see Palmer, 1999) and the well established notion that the subjective estimate of the visual vertical depends strongly on vestibular and proprioceptive cues (Mergner et al., 1997; Van Beuzekom & Van Gisbergen, 2000) . The immersive visual presentation of Senot et al. (2005) presumably enforced a viewer-centred representation, in which congruence between visual, vestibular and neck proprioceptive cues was important to define a gravity reference. The screen projection of Indovina et al. (2005) , instead, presumably enforced an allocentric, scene-based representation, in which congruence between visual and non-visual cues was less important to define an abstract gravity reference. Instead of providing evidence against the internal model hypothesis, these results indicate that the interception responses may be tuned with reference to allocentric cues in the visual scene, irrespective of the actual spatial orientation of the gravity vector and of the body.
Effect of air friction
Baurès point out that in our studies we modelled TTC neglecting the effect of air friction. Here we discuss the effect of both drag and buoyancy. The equation of motion, along a vertical path, for a sphere of mass m and radius R, falling in air (with density q = 1.293 kg m À3 ) at Reynolds number >10 3 is (Timmerman & van der Weele, 1999) :
m * is the mass of the displaced air, and m * g the resulting buoyant force. The second term on the right hand side of Eq. (1) is the quadratic drag force. One can easily calculate that the difference in total travel time between falling in the vacuum and falling in air would be 0.6 ms for the typical case we used in several studies (0.6-kg, 9-cm-diameter ball dropped from 1.6 m as in Figs. 1 and  2) . Therefore, the effect of air drag and buoyancy was indeed negligible under these experimental conditions. However, the effect is non-negligible for other conditions, as in the example of the tabletennis ball made by Baurès. In a similar vein, Lacquaniti (2005b, p. 1347 ) wrote ''It should be noticed that a fixed model of free-fall would not be appropriate to deal with a variety of natural conditions even on Earth. Thus vertical motion of objects is accelerated by gravity and decelerated to a variable extent by air (or other fluid) friction depending on the object's mass, size, shape, texture and fluid viscosity. Does the brain develop an internal model for each specific environment or does it adapt a single general model by tuning its parameters?" Based on a series of adaptation experiments, they suggested that subjects learn to deal with different types of targets on Earth by changing the time of trigger of the interceptive action, rather than by adapting the internalized estimate of target acceleration (see also McIntyre et al., 2003) . However, this hypothesis awaits further experimental confirmation.
9. Must the internal model of gravity be exact?
In the formulation of their arguments, Baurès appear to attribute to us a claim we never made, namely that there is an exact model of Newton's laws in the brain that would allow the exact estimation of TTC for interception. From an epistemological standpoint, there can be no exact models of the world in the brain, because only the world can be its own exact model, as was realized already by Plato in the famous metaphor of the cave. From an experimental standpoint, the available evidence (Indovina et al., 2005; McIntyre et al., 2001; Senot et al., 2005; Zago et al., 2004) is that brain representations of target motions can deviate so markedly from true Newtonian physics to be better construed as naïve physics. Thus, the Spacelab experiments mentioned above strongly argued against any precise model of Newton's laws. Quite to the contrary, these experiments showed an interceptive behaviour blindly guided by simplified, inexact physics: Astronauts in orbit continued to expect the effect of Earth gravity on a descending target when all cognitive and sensory evidence clearly attested that there was none (McIntyre et al., 2001) . In fact, scientists working with astronauts know very well several striking examples of behaviour that betray a sensori-motor disregard of Newton's laws. The observations in microgravity obviously indicated that the answer to the title of our paper ''Does the brain model Newton's laws?" was ''Yes, but only with approximate parameters". Similar conclusions have later been reached using simulated visual 0g on Earth (Senot et al., 2005; Zago & Lacquaniti, 2005b; Zago et al., 2004 Zago et al., , 2005 . By the same token, the idea that there is a neural system able to produce exact estimates of TTC for interception is untenable given the non-deterministic nature of the inputs, outputs and intervening neural processing.
It is important to distinguish between a biological phenomenon, its numerical modelling, and the neural implementation of the model. The observation that interception of free-falling targets can be quite accurate (not exact) under daily-life conditions does not imply that the CNS solves explicitly the corresponding equations of motion. To make an example from a different field of motor control, it has been argued successfully that minimum jerk is an underlying principle to generate arm movement trajectories (Flash & Hogan, 1985) . Minimization of jerk can be explained in terms of Hamilton variational calculus, but this does not mean that the brain needs to explicitly solve the Hamiltonian to produce minimum jerk trajectories. In their case as in ours, modelling the data by means of standard equations does not imply that these equations are actually embodied in brain processing. ''All models are wrong, but some are useful", according to a statement credited to statistician George Box. We are convinced that our modelling has been useful to design new experiments and to check the corre-sponding predictions. However, the issue of how the CNS implements an internal model of gravity remains open. For instance, the CNS might implement a close approximation of a Kalman filter, involving recurrent basis functions networks with attractor dynamics (Denève, Duhamel, & Pouget, 2007) . Kalman filters run an internal model in parallel with, not in series with, the sensorimotor loop, thus avoiding the bottleneck of representations (Grush, 2005) . They use sensory noise and process disturbance co-variance matrices to determine the Kalman gain. However, it seems unlikely that the CNS has an implementation of an accurate and complete system identification of the environment, as required by the Kalman filter. Instead, it might implement a variety of filters tuned to either gravitational motion or to other environmental dynamic interactions (Grush, 2005) .
Our statement of the hypothesis
Our view has been expressed in several papers consistently through the years. Thus, Lacquaniti et al. (1993a, p. 389) stated that when planning a catching action, ''a priori knowledge on the most likely path and law of motion is presumably used in conjunction with visual on-line information" (italic is ours). McIntyre et al. (2001, p. 694) interpreted the results of microgravity experiments as showing that ''Under these conditions" (microgravity in the Spacelab) ''the brain gives credence to an internal model of the physical world in which a downward moving object should accelerate". Zago et al. (2004 Zago et al. ( , p. 1620 presented ''evidence in favour of the view that the brain makes the best estimate about target motion based on visually measured kinematics and an a priori guess about the causes of motion." In a simulation study we showed how adjustments of the TTC threshold, and not the a priori acceleration value itself, could be used to anticipate the effects of gravity on an upward versus downward movement , and we went so far as to coin the term ''pretty good internal models of laws of motion". Senot et al. (2005, p. 4478 ) went on to summarize their experimental results on interception of virtual targets moving with different laws of motion as indicative of ''a rather unsophisticated model of the effects of gravity (±1g acceleration is not explicitly taken into account in the estimate of TTC)". Thus, we stressed the notion of implicit, approximate, probabilistic knowledge of the effects of gravity on object motion, as opposed to a notion of explicit, precise, analytic knowledge of Newtonian mechanics. Moreover, we made it clear that such knowledge may be used for interception of targets in free-fall, but not necessarily for cognitive understanding of object motion (Zago & Lacquaniti, 2005a) . The latter seems to be governed by heuristic conceptions of physics, reminiscent of Aristotelian or medieval impetus theories (Bozzi, 1990; Champagne, Klopfer, & Anderson, 1980; Kozhevnikov & Hegarthy, 2001 ).
Conclusions
Despite the inherent limitations of individual experimental paradigms, the results from a long list of very different experiments carried out over the last 20 years (first paper on the subject, Lacquaniti & Maioli, 1987) converge toward the conclusion that the effects of Earth's gravity are taken into account in intercepting the free-fall of a ball. This conclusion goes along with the hypothesis that observers make use of prior knowledge about the size of an object in judging the object flight-time (DeLucia, 1991; López-Moliner, Field, & Wann, 2007) . Just as gravity in our approach, known size is not considered by López-Moliner et al. (2007) as a cognitive, declarative parameter. It rather results from a process of calibration whereby, through experience, people learn to adapt their action by judging the flight of a specific, size-constant object.
